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Executive summary
Life expectancy differs from person to person, 
population to population and pension scheme to 
pension scheme. So, your scheme members’ mortality 
experience will be unique. Age is its dominant 
determinant, but life expectancy is influenced by 
other factors including gender, geographical location, 
social class, pension size and occupation.
In order to help you understand the effects that these 
factors have on your scheme members’ mortality, we 
look at issues that shape the current life expectancy 
of your members, and then separately, the trends in 
the rate of improvement in life expectancy.
Current life expectancy depends very much on 
demographic factors, particularly lifestyle, and varies 
from scheme to scheme, i.e. it is scheme specific. 
It is therefore very important that you understand 
where your scheme sits in the population of pension 
schemes as far as life expectancy is concerned.
We also look at the improving trend in mortality. 
UK life expectancy has nearly doubled over the past 
150 years, increasing by 2 to 2.5 years a decade on 
average. These improvements have consistently 
exceeded official projections. 
You need to understand the assumptions underlying 
your pension scheme’s life expectancy projections. To 
help you, we present a range of views on future life 
expectancy. This range reflects both the uncertainty 
of life and the lack of a commonly accepted 
forecasting model.
Finally, we consider how you might quantify the 
risk in your mortality assumptions by looking at the 
impact varying the assumptions has on your scheme 
liabilities. For example, the Pensions Regulator 
estimates that two years of extra life could add 5% to 
the value of a defined benefit plan’s liabilities.
You need to decide whether the longevity risk in 
your pension scheme is material to your organisation 
and, therefore, of strategic importance. To help 
you, we introduce two categories of longevity risk 
(idiosyncratic and aggregate, see Section 4.1, pg 31) 
and discuss their financial implications.
If your scheme’s longevity risk is material, you might 
want to seek specialist advice as to how you might 
manage it. Options include changing benefits, laying 
off some of the risks or buying out the pension 
liabilities.
In a consultation document issued in February 2008, 
the Pensions Regulator has indicated what it considers 
good practice when choosing assumptions for defined 
benefit pension schemes, with a specific focus on 
mortality, and proposes to exercise greater scrutiny 
where that is not met.
Inevitably you will need to discuss longevity 
assumptions with your actuary and to assist you 
in these discussions we have devised a checklist 
(see pg 53), focusing on three key areas: current life 
expectancy, projected life expectancy and longevity 
risk. The checklist is also available as a separate PDF. 
Please visit www.cimaglobal.com/pensions
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Defined benefit schemes are designed on the basis 
of reasonable assumptions about their members’ 
mortality. But, from a sponsoring company’s 
viewpoint, scheme members are increasingly 
behaving unreasonably. Human longevity is increasing 
faster than previously predicted. Could ‘apocalyptic 
demography’ undermine the financial viability of your 
DB scheme?
‘A mortality rate refers to the assumed 
probability of dying within a year whereas 
longevity usually refers to the future expected 
lifetime derived from any particular set of 
mortality rates’
The Pensions Regulator, 2008
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This document has been prepared for finance directors of 
organisations with significant defined benefit (DB) pension 
liabilities. We know that managing DB scheme risks is a challenge 
high on many of your agendas. In our opinion, longevity risk – the 
risk that pension scheme members will live materially longer than 
assumed – is the most topical and challenging of those risks. 
1 Introduction
Many clever people – doctors, biologists, food 
scientists, physical fitness instructors, public health 
campaigners and social scientists – are working hard 
to extend the human lifespan. You might be unaware 
of continuing improvements in longevity. You might 
not know that further, substantial increases in 
longevity are possible in the foreseeable future. 
In Section 2 (pg 10-18), we explore life expectancy 
based on current mortality experience. We consider 
different views on future life expectancy and discuss 
alternative projection methods in Section 3
(pg 19-29). We then discuss longevity risk – the 
uncertainty attached to estimates of the length 
of future lifetimes – and its potential financial 
consequences in Section 4 (pg 30-39). We also list 
some actions that can be taken to manage longevity 
risk.
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In our report The pension liability – Managing the 
corporate risk (CIMA, 2008), we include a list of 
questions about longevity risk that we suggest you 
should ask your pension scheme actuary. We now 
present an enhanced list of questions in the Longevity 
risk checklist (see pg 53-59). We hope that this report 
will demonstrate why we consider these questions, 
and their answers, important, and we hope that 
it will assist you in explaining and communicating 
longevity risk to the relevant stakeholders in your 
organisation’s DB scheme. Finally, it should help you 
to ‘position’ your scheme’s longevity profile in relation 
to the available benchmarks; and to understand 
your actuary’s reasons for the longevity assumptions 
chosen.
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Ageing is not a biological necessity. Not all creatures 
age. The mortality rates of freshwater hydra and sea 
anemones, for example, do not increase with age 
(Kirkwood, 1999). So, it is just as well that neither 
hydras nor sea anemones are members of your 
pension scheme.
2 Current life expectancy
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Humans age, but life expectancies differ from 
person to person, population to population and 
pension scheme to pension scheme. Your scheme 
members’ life expectancy is unique. Age is the 
dominant determinant but life expectancy is 
influenced by many other factors: some genetic; some 
environmental. 
This section looks at life expectancy based on current 
mortality rates. We explain how life expectancy 
is affected by such factors as gender, geographical 
location, social class, pension size and occupation, in 
addition to age. 
All of the tables and figures in this section are based 
on current, or the most recently available, mortality 
data (as at April 2008).
2.1 Gender
If mortality rates remain as they were in 2004-06, we 
can expect 65 year old UK male pensioners to live a 
further 16.9 years and 65 year old women a further 
19.7 years (ONS, 2007b). 
Why don’t men live as long as women? (It was 
not always this way; in the 19th century, male life 
expectancy was little different from that of females.) 
Possible reasons include higher rates of smoking, 
greater exposure to occupational hazards, more 
deaths from accidents and violence, and greater 
susceptibility to death from heart disease (Tuljapurkar 
and Boe, 1998).
2.2 Geographical location
Table 1 shows expected future lifetimes in years for 
males and females at birth and at age 65 for the 
constituent countries of the UK.
This table demonstrates that, in the UK, life 
expectancy is highest in England and lowest in 
Scotland. Females have higher life expectancy than 
males in all countries.
Table 1 UK life expectancy, 2004-06 
 At birth  At age 65
 males females males females
Scotland 74.6 79.6 15.8 18.6
Northern Ireland 76.1 81.0 16.6 19.5
Wales 76.6 80.9 16.7 19.5
England 77.2 81.5 17.1 19.9
United Kingdom 76.9 81.3 16.9 19.7
Source: Office for National Statistics (2007b),
Life expectancy continues to rise
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Figure 1 shows average life 
expectancy for males in 
each region; the picture for 
females is broadly similar.
Figure 1 Male life expectancy at birth: by local authority, 2004-06
Source: Office for National Statistics, Subnational life expectancy – life expectancy at birth by local authority, 1992-2005
Life expectancy (years)
79.1 or over
78.1 to 79.0
77.1 to 78.0
75.9 to 77.0
75.8 or under
2 Current life expectancy
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UK life expectancy also varies by region, as illustrated 
by Figure 1 and Table 2.
Is there a North/South divide? Almost: as Tables 
1 (pg 11) and 2 (pg 13) and Figure 1 (pg 12) show, 
the lowest life expectancies are found in Scotland 
and the North East and North West of England. The 
South East, South West and East of England have the 
highest life expectancies.
 
The local authority with the highest male life 
expectancy at age 65 in 2004-06 was Kensington and 
Chelsea (22.0 years); 8.2 years more than Glasgow 
City. Kensington and Chelsea also had the highest life 
expectancy for 65 year old females (24.8 years); 7.5 
years more than Glasgow City (ONS, 2007c).
Table 3 shows that UK life expectancy at age 65 is 
modest compared to that of the other ‘Group of 
Eight’ nations. Willets et al (2004) attribute this 
mediocre UK performance to high death rates from 
circulatory disorders, particularly heart disease, and 
poor cancer survival rates.
Table 2 Regional life expectancy in England, 2004-06
 At birth At age 65
 males females males females
North East 75.8 80.1 16.2 18.8
North West 75.7 80.3 16.3 19.1
Yorkshire and The Humber 76.6 81.0 16.8 19.6
East Midlands 77.3 81.3 17.1 19.7
West Midlands 76.6 81.1 16.8 19.7
East of England 78.3 82.3 17.6 20.3
London 77.4 82.0 17.5 20.3
South East 78.5 82.4 17.9 20.5
South West 78.5 82.7 17.9 20.8
England 77.2 81.5 17.1 19.9
Source: Office for National Statistics (2007d), Health Statistics Quarterly
Table 3 Population life expectancy
at age 65, by country
 At age 65 
 males females
Japan 18.1 23.1
Canada 17.3 20.6
France 17.1 21.3
Italy 17.1 20.9
UK 16.9 19.7
USA 16.7 19.4
Germany 16.3 19.5
Russia 11.1 15.2
Source: Paternoster (2006) and, for the UK,
Office for National Statistics (2007b),
Life expectancy continues to rise
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2.3 Social class
Socioeconomic status has a big influence on life 
expectancy; Table 4 shows life expectancy at age 65, 
by social class*, in England and Wales for 2002-05.
Table 4 shows that, for both men and women, there 
is a social gradient such that those in the unskilled 
manual class have the lowest life expectancy and 
those in the professional class the highest. 
Social class reflects a person’s affluence, education, 
lifestyle and position in society. Money buys you 
healthy food, good housing and better medical 
treatment. Education provides you with knowledge 
about health risks and healthy behaviour. Social 
capital helps you when you need information, 
connections and emotional and practical support 
(Hoffman, 2005). Such support may be one reason 
why married people live longer than single people 
(Tuljapurkar and Boe, 1998).
* For definitions of each class, see Table 5, pg 15
2 Current life expectancy
Table 4 Life expectancy in England and Wales at age 65:
by social class and gender, 2002-05
Class description males females
Non-manual  
I Professional 18.3 22.0
II Managerial and technical/intermediate 18.0 21.0
IIIN Skilled non-manual  17.4 19.9
Manual
IIIM Skilled manual 16.3 18.7
IV Partly skilled 15.7 18.9
V Unskilled 14.1 17.7
All   16.6 19.4
Source: Office for National Statistics (2007a), Variations persist in life expectancy by social class
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Those in the lower social classes are more likely to 
smoke, consume excessive amounts of alcohol, eat 
unhealthy food and not exercise (Ageaction, 2007). 
They also participate less in social networks, receive 
less social support and are more pessimistic
(Stansfeld and Marmot, 1992). Yet, the average life 
expectancy of a female manual worker still exceeds 
that of the highest status male. 
Because people who live in the same residential 
district tend to come from a similar social class, 
postcode tends to be a good guide to life expectancy. 
In recent years, it has become standard practice 
to use postcodes for pricing bulk annuities and, in 
November 2007, Legal & General announced that it 
would use customers’ postcodes as an additional risk 
factor in determining pension annuity income
(Legal & General, 2007). 
Members of defined benefit pension schemes tend 
to live longer than other members of the general 
population (Paternoster, 2007). So, when estimating 
scheme members’ longevity, UK pension actuaries 
tend to use mortality data collected and published 
by the Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) of 
The Actuarial Profession (with suitable adjustments 
to reflect any significant differences in the mortality 
experience of specific schemes), rather than Office for 
National Statistics’ (ONS) population data. 
The most recent CMI actuarial tables are the ‘00’ 
series. They became effective from 1 September 2006 
and are founded on mortality data centred on the 
year 2000. Based on the mortality rates recorded in 
the ‘00’ series tables, 65 year old men and women 
have life expectancies of, respectively, 18.4 years and 
20.9 years (CMI, 2007b); right at the top end of UK 
population life expectancy.
Table 5 Definition of social class
Class description Examples of occupation
Non-manual
I Professional Doctors, chartered accountants, professionally qualified engineers
II Managerial and
 technical/intermediate Managers, school teachers, journalists
IIIN Skilled non-manual  Clerks, cashiers, retail staff
Manual
IIIM Skilled manual Supervisors of manual workers, plumbers, electricians, goods vehicle drivers
IV Partly skilled Warehousemen, security guards, machine tool operators, care assistants,
  waiters and waitresses
V Unskilled Labourers, cleaners and messengers
Source: Office for National Statistics (2007a), Variations persist in life expectancy by social class
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We know that blue collar workers tend to earn 
less than white collar workers and Table 4 (pg 14) 
shows that they also have lower life expectancies. 
It is also true that those with the smallest pensions 
will be those with the lowest life expectancy; and 
the pension scheme members of companies with 
predominantly manual workers, such as those in 
heavy industries, will have lower life expectancies 
than those of companies which employ many
non-manual workers, such as those in service 
industries. 
2.4 Pension size
The mortality data in the CMI actuarial tables are 
collected from life assurance companies, and the 
pensioner tables used by most pension scheme 
actuaries record the mortality experience of 
pensioners in insured group schemes.
2 Current life expectancy
The mortality experience of these pensioners, who 
are generally from the higher socioeconomic groups, 
differs from that of members of occupational pension 
schemes. Although, for a long time, this was the only 
data available and so they were used by pension 
scheme actuaries to determine mortality assumptions 
in occupational pension schemes as well. 
Recently, however, the CMI has begun a study of 
the mortality experience in occupational pension 
schemes. The study is called the ‘self-administered 
pension schemes’ or ‘SAPS’ study. It contains 
mortality data from a sample of self-administered 
pension schemes with at least 500 pensioners 
covering the period 2000-06 (CMI, 2008). In January 
2008, the CMI published draft actuarial tables based 
on the mortality rates of pensioners in the SAPS 
study. 
Figure 2 Relationship between pension size and male mortality in self-administered pension schemes (SAPS) 
– relative to ‘00’ series mortality – 2000-06
* Relative mortality %: Actual death rate of male pensioners in the SAPS study as a percentage of that expected on the basis 
of the ‘00’ tables. Note: ‘00’ series mortality set at 100 in each age band. Source: CMI (2008, Chart 11)
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The SAPS study provides evidence that life 
expectancy varies with pension size. Figure 2 (pg 16) 
compares the actual mortality experience of male 
pensioners in the SAPS study with that expected 
on the basis of the mortality data in the ‘00’ series 
tables, with the ‘00’ series data scaled to be 100. 
Both the SAPS study data and the ‘00’ series data, 
underlying Figure 2, were based on amounts of 
pension paid. The CMI also produces mortality data 
based on pensioner lives.
The vertical axis in Figure 2 (pg 16) records the actual 
death rate of male pensioners in the SAPS study as a 
percentage of that expected on the basis of the ‘00’ 
tables; and the horizontal axis shows their age band. 
For example, the mortality rate of males aged 50 to 
54 with an annual pension of less than £3,000 was 
160% of that expected on the basis of the ‘00’ tables.
Figure 2 (pg 16) reveals that those men in the SAPS 
study sample who received a pension of less than 
£8,500 a year experienced higher than average 
mortality and those receiving more than £13,000 
a year experienced lower than average mortality, 
in comparison with the insured lives underlying the 
‘00’ series. The relationship between pension size 
and mortality is strongest at age 50 to 59 and it 
diminishes significantly at higher ages. Note that 
mortality rates are fairly low in absolute terms in the 
50 to 59 age band, so the apparently large relative 
differences in the figures imply only small differences 
in absolute terms; the opposite holds at higher ages 
because absolute mortality rates are higher and small 
relative differences imply big absolute differences.
This effect was also present for female pensioners, 
although the size of their pensions was smaller. 
The SAPS study also reveals that, based on recent 
mortality rates, the life expectancy of SAPS 
pensioners is lower than that of pensioners in insured 
schemes. This can be seen by examining the dark 
blue line in Figure 2 which rises above the 100 line 
for ages above 60. As we previously mentioned, this 
is because there are more blue collar workers in the 
SAPS sample. It reinforces our earlier point that life 
expectancy differs from population to population and 
that your pension scheme members’ life expectancy 
is unique. 
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2.5 Industrial sector
Table 6 confirms that life expectancy varies by 
reference to industrial sector. As in Figure 2 (pg 16), 
the actual mortality (‘A’) of male pensioners in the 
SAPS study is compared to that expected (‘E’) on 
the basis of the ‘00’ series mortality data, with the 
‘00’ series data scaled to be 100%. The data were 
averaged by amount of pension.
Table 6 also shows average pension size for the 
different sectors. It reveals a negative relationship 
between relative mortality and pension size. A 
regression of the second column on the third column 
has a statistically significant (at the 10% level) slope 
coefficient of -0.0016. This suggests that a scheme 
member with a pension £1000pa higher than that of 
another member has a mortality rate that is typically 
1.6% lower. 
Although pension size is a potentially useful indicator 
of an individual’s life expectancy, it can be misleading 
unless we have complete information about all the 
pensions that the individual has; many people have 
pensions from different sources and the CMI studies 
are not always able to link individuals to all their 
pension pots. Social class is, therefore, probably a 
better guide to life expectancy than pension size.
2.6 Summary
Life expectancy differs from population to population. 
Your pension scheme members’ life expectancy 
is influenced by factors such as their age, gender, 
geographical region, social class, pension size and the 
industrial sector in which your organisation operates. 
Age is the dominant determinant of life expectancy, 
followed by gender and social class. 
2 Current life expectancy
Some of these factors overlap. For example, both 
social class and pension size reflect a person’s 
affluence and lifestyle. Official statistics define a 
person’s social class by reference to their occupation 
which, in turn, is often related to the industrial sector 
within which they work.
In order to get a deeper understanding of the life 
expectancies of your pension scheme members, 
it is useful to quantify these factors – age, gender, 
geographical region, social class, pension size and 
industrial sector for your own scheme. 
In Section 3 (pg 19-29), Projected life expectancy, 
we will consider whether these differences in life 
expectancy are likely to persist throughout your 
pension scheme members’ lifetimes.
Table 6 Mortality rates and pension size of male pensioners
by industry group, 2000-04
Sector 100 A/E ‘00’ series Average pension size
  £ per annum
Financials 98 13,471
Miscellaneous 100  5,512
Utilities 109  8,690
Non-cyclical consumer goods 111  6,446
Cyclical consumer goods 113  3,496
IT 114  9,642
General industries 116  4,178
Local authorities 119  5,056
Basic industries 124  5,840
Cyclical services 124  5,649
Source: CMI (2007a, Tables N and P)
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We explored life expectancy based on 
current, or recent, mortality rates in 
Section 2 (pg 10-18). This should have 
given you an understanding of some of 
the factors that currently influence life 
expectancy. However, if mortality rates 
continue to fall as they have in the past, 
life expectancy based on current mortality 
rates will be of limited use to you in 
estimating your pension scheme’s costs 
and liabilities.
3 Projected life expectancy
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3.1 Trends
Figure 3 reveals that life expectancy at age 65 in the 
UK has risen steadily since 1981 and is now at its 
highest level ever for both men and women. If UK 
mortality rates remain as they were in 2004-06, men 
aged 65 can expect to live a further 16.9 years and 
women of that age a further 19.7 years.
3 Projected life expectancy
Between 1980-82 and 2004-06, life expectancy 
at age 65 in the UK increased by 4.0 years for men 
and by 2.8 years for women. Around one-quarter 
of this increase occurred over the last four years 
(ONS, 2007b). So, as Figure 3 reveals, the difference 
between the life expectancies of men and women is 
narrowing.
In this section, we review past trends in life expectancy, discuss opportunities for 
future advances and consider alternative life expectancy projections. 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2007b), Life expectancy continues to rise
Figure 3 Life expectancy at age 65 in the UK
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Figure 4 shows that this rising life expectancy trend 
has persisted for over 150 years, during which time 
average human life expectancy within industrialised 
countries has nearly doubled, increasing, on average, 
by 2.5 years per decade for females and by 2.0 years 
a decade for males. (For the purpose of Figure 4, life 
expectancy is the mean age at death under mortality 
conditions ruling at the time.)
Figure 4 shows the country that had the highest 
recorded life expectancy for the female population 
in a particular year. In 1840, for example, Sweden 
held the highest globally recorded life expectancy for 
females. 
Since about 1840, record life expectancy has risen 
at an average rate of around three months per year: 
from 45 years for Swedish women in 1840 to 85 years 
for Japanese women in 2000.
Figure 4 Record life expectancy from 1840 to 2000 for women
Source: Supplemental material of Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) (R2 = 99.2%).
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Rising life expectancy has had a dramatic effect 
on the cost of pension provision. As Figure 5  
demonstrates, only about 35% of those born in 
England and Wales in 1851 reached retirement age; 
whereas over 80% of those born in 1951 can expect 
to pick up their pensions. Some experts are now 
predicting that as many as 50% of today’s 30 year 
olds could live to age 100 (Paternoster, 2007).
3 Projected life expectancy
Figure 5 shows that the increase in life expectancy 
was originally, to a large extent, due to a reduction in 
infant and child mortality; the 1951 cohort does not 
exhibit the drop in the survival curve between age 0 
and 16 experienced by the 1851 and 1901 cohorts. 
Infant mortality rates at the beginning of the 20th 
century were nearly 30 times higher than those at 
the end; and childhood mortality rates were over 50 
times higher (Griffiths and Brock, 2003).
In the second half of the century, there was a decline 
in mortality among middle-aged and older people; 
so, the survival curve for the 1951 cohort is more 
‘rectangular’ than the other curves. The increasing 
‘rectangularisation’ of survival curves over time 
suggests that many more people will live to very old 
age in the future but then will die off in a narrow age 
band.
The mortality rates of UK pensioners declined rapidly 
in the last quarter of the century; between 1979 and 
2003, death rates fell by 41% for men aged 65 to 84 
and by almost a third for women of that age (ONS, 
2006a). 
A feature of the increase in UK life expectancy has 
been, what the ONS and the CMI term, the ‘cohort 
effect’: a higher than average rate of improvement 
in mortality rates for generations born in the UK 
between 1925 and 1945, centred on the generation 
born in 1931 (GAD, 2001). Figure 6 (pg 23) illustrates 
the cohort effect by showing the generations that 
have experienced the greatest improvements in 
mortality over the last four decades of the 20th 
century.
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Source: Office for National Statistics (2005, page 86; 1951 cohort includes a projection 
beyond current age of 54 in 2005), Focus on people and migration
Figure 5 Percentage chance of survival to exact age:
selected cohorts, males
England and Wales
Number alive out of each 100 born – males
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In Figure 6, each decade (1960s-1990s), as 
represented by each coloured line on the graph, is 
shown against the average annualised mortality 
improvement rates in five year age bands. 
In the 1960s, men in England and Wales in their 30s 
saw the biggest mortality improvement rates (A), 
in the 1970s this same cohort, now in its 40s, again 
saw the biggest improvement (B). This continued in 
the 1980s (C) and 1990s (D), making this generation 
of men born in the 1930s the ‘golden cohort’, living 
longer than those cohorts born before or after.
Figure 6 therefore shows that this cohort experienced 
the biggest mortality improvements, compared with 
younger and older generations.
This cohort has reached what has been ‘old age’ in 
unprecedented good health: ‘70 is the new 50’. Old 
age is undergoing a profound transformation, despite 
the higher prevalence of age-associated conditions 
such as Alzheimer’s disease and osteoporosis. So, 
ageing seems to be malleable (Kirkwood, 2007).
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Figure 6 The cohort effect: average annual rate of mortality improvement, England and Wales 
population, by age group and decade, males
Source: Willets et al (2004, Figure 2.15a)
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3.2 Biomedical opportunities
If it is malleable, we should be able to further delay 
ageing. Biologists have successfully extended the life 
span of yeast, nematode worms, fruit flies and mice. 
Now they want to do the same for us. 
The consensus is that ageing is due to the lifelong, 
gradual accumulation of a variety of molecular faults 
in the cells and organs of our bodies. About a quarter 
of the variation in lifespan is attributable to genetic 
differences (Hershkind et al., 1996). But there is no 
death gene. Genes do not control clock-like timing 
mechanisms. Rather, they influence the activity of 
cellular maintenance systems, such as DNA repair and 
antioxidant defence (Kirkwood, 2007). 
3 Projected life expectancy
Another quarter of the difference in life expectancy 
is thought to be due to non-genetic factors that are 
fixed by the age of 30, with the other half due to 
environmental factors occurring thereafter (Vaupel et 
al., 1998). Social scientists want to better understand 
how they can reduce this part of the variation in 
life span attributable to non-genetic causes. They 
believe that the factors influencing longevity include 
nutrition, lifestyle (including exercise), education, 
housing, employment and the nature of work 
(Kirkwood, 2007).
 
Figure 7 shows the four disease groups with the 
highest mortality rates.
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Figure 7 Mortality rates in England and Wales for selected disease groups, 1911-2003
Source: Office for National Statistics (2006b, pg 14), Focus on health
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Scientists believe that ageing can, to an extent, be 
counteracted by ‘maintenance and repair factors’ 
that slow down the rate at which tissues and organs 
deteriorate and keep the body healthy. Even if risk 
factors are present, boosting maintenance factors 
may render a person less likely to develop an
age-related disease. Conversely, if a person is exposed 
to adverse factors that exacerbate the accumulation 
of cellular damage, such as poor nutrition and stress, 
then the early onset of age-related diseases is more 
probable. 
Figure 7 (pg 24) highlights the success the scientific 
and medical professions enjoyed in reducing deaths 
from infections. 
Today, circulatory diseases (which include heart 
disease and strokes), respiratory diseases and cancer 
remain the most common causes of death in the 
UK. There is a gradient of increasing mortality from 
these causes between unskilled manual workers 
and professionals (ONS, 2006b). Progress in curing 
these diseases has been greatest for the circulatory 
diseases, followed by the respiratory diseases, with 
little sign of a cure for cancer on the horizon. Since we 
have to die of something, it is most likely to be cancer 
for the foreseeable future. 
Research on fruit flies shows that the likelihood 
of dying decreases at very old age. If applicable to 
humans, this suggests that there might be a specified 
age, perhaps around 65 to 75, during which we are 
particularly vulnerable to fatal diseases. If we can 
survive this ‘bottleneck’, we are likely to experience 
a reduction in mortality rates (Friedland, 1998). This 
might be nothing more than the ‘rectangularisation’ 
of the survivor curve, discussed previously, but it 
could lead to an increase in the human lifespan.
According to Willets et al (2004), developments such 
as the decoding of the human genome and stem cell 
research have the potential to yield increasingly more 
significant gains in life expectancy. Some scientists 
claim that we will see the fruits of their anti-ageing 
research within just a few decades. So, some experts 
think it highly probable that, within this timescale, life 
expectancy at retirement will actually surge upwards 
(Willets et al, 2004, paragraph 6.1.2).
It is impossible to know how biomedical advances 
might affect the different factors that influence life 
expectancy, but their effects might be significant. We 
know that the main factors affecting longevity are 
environmental, rather than genetic. We also know 
that the medical profession and social scientists are 
actively trying to remedy those environmental factors 
that they believe contribute to the comparatively high 
UK mortality rates. Reducing inequalities in health 
between the social classes is a government priority. 
Specific targets have included reducing mortality 
rates in people under the age of 75, by 2010: from 
heart disease by at least 40% and from cancer by at 
least 20% (Department of Health, 2002). So, there 
must be a good chance that, in the next 25 years or 
so, the differences in longevity between the sexes and 
the social classes will narrow. 
The introduction of the ban on smoking in pubs, 
for example, and the implementation of the recent 
suggestion that all men over 50 should be given a 
daily dose of the cholesterol-reducing drug ‘statins’ 
are likely to have much bigger effects on the 
mortality rates of male manual workers than on 
female professionals. 
Such developments help demonstrate why projecting 
life expectancy is so difficult.
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3.3 Projection methods
Life expectancy can be expressed as a mathematical 
function of mortality rates by age. Indeed, it equals 
the sum of one minus the mortality rate at each age 
from the projection age until the maximum death age 
(usually set at 120).1 So, the usual way of estimating 
life expectancy is to project age-specific mortality 
rates into the future and then use the results to 
compute life expectancy projections (Wilmoth, 
2000).
If, as Figure 4 (pg 21) suggests, the trend is linear, 
projecting life expectancy should be easy. But, as 
Figure 8 illustrates, UK life expectancy projections 
have consistently underestimated future mortality 
improvements. Indeed, projections were actually 
reduced in the early 1970s, with the 1977 based 
projection being the most pessimistic.
The ONS distinguishes ‘extrapolative’ projection 
methods from ‘process based’ and ‘explanatory’ 
methods (GAD, 2001). 
3 Projected life expectancy
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1 E.g. Life expectancy at 65 = 0.5 + (1-q65) + (1-q65)*(1-q66) 
+ (1-q65)*(1-q66)*(1-q67) + ...+ (1-q65)* ... *(1-q120) and 
q120 is typically set to unity and q65 is the mortality rate at 
age 65 etc.
Figure 8 Accuracy of Office for National Statistics mortality 
assumptions; actual and projected period life expectancy at birth,
UK males, 1966-2031
Source: Shaw (2007, pg 16)
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Extrapolative methods project historical mortality 
trends into the future. There are numerous ways in 
which this can be done, but all include an element 
of subjective judgement. Extrapolative methods 
can be either ‘deterministic’, meaning that one set 
of projected rates based on a predetermined set of 
parameters is produced, or ‘stochastic’, meaning that 
the projected rates contain a random or unpredictable 
element. 
Process based methods employ models based on 
biomedical processes. They are not currently much 
used, partly because the processes causing death are 
not well understood and, partly because of difficulties 
in accurately identifying and recording the correct 
cause of death (there is often more than one). 
Scientific and medical advances may increase their 
relevance.
Explanatory based or ‘causal’ methods use models 
based on economic causes of mortality such as social 
class. Again, they are rarely used in official projections 
because the economic causes of mortality are not 
well enough understood or because the underlying 
data are unreliable. 
Extrapolative methods will only be reliable if the 
past trends continue. Advances in medicine or 
the emergence of new diseases can invalidate 
extrapolative projections by changing the trend and, 
as with all extrapolative methods, it takes time for 
the data to differentiate between a genuine change 
in trend and a couple of outliers around an otherwise 
unchanged trend.
3.4 A range of views
Figure 9 draws together some recent projections of 
life expectancy for 65 year old males.
This range of views reflects both the uncertainty 
of lifetimes and the lack of an agreed forecasting 
method. Some of the projections are for populations 
(of the UK or England and Wales) and some are for 
pensioners in insured group schemes.
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Figure 9 Some recent projections of life expectancy for 65 year old males
Sources: Pensions Institute calculations – data sources: CMI (2007b), Cairns et al. (2006) 
for the CBD projection, Paternoster (2007) for the Paternoster projection
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3 Projected life expectancy
To date, partly because of the cohort effect, actual 
mortality improvements have exceeded those of the 
‘92’ series projection. So, in 2002, the CMI published 
the ‘short’, ‘medium’ and ‘long’ ‘interim cohort 
projections’. These adjust the ‘92’ series projection 
and reflect three different views about how long 
the cohort effect will continue. All three projections 
assume that the cohort effect will start to fade away 
from 2000; and they assume that it will disappear 
completely by 2010, 2020 and 2040, respectively.
In consultation documents issued in February 2008, 
the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) has decided that, 
in future, its levy should be based on a mortality 
assumption of medium cohort with a 1% underpin 
(see Glossary pg 42) and the Pensions Regulator is 
proposing that recovery plans, based on valuations 
with effective dates from March 2007, which contain 
mortality assumptions that are weaker than the long 
cohort projection, or that assume that the rate of 
improvement tends towards zero and do not have 
some form of underpin, will attract further scrutiny 
(the Pensions Regulator, 2008).
We have used the ‘00’ series actual experience line 
(male life expectancy of 18.4 years) in Figure 9
(pg 27) to reflect the view, held by demographers 
such as Olshansky, that life expectancy is about to 
plateau. And, indeed, US mortality rates do seem 
as if they might have begun to plateau at higher 
ages (Willets et al, 2004). Demographers cannot 
explain this, but, perhaps unsurprisingly, many of 
those who believe that there are biological limits to 
the human lifespan live in the US. Obesity may be 
one explanation for the poor US performance and 
some commentators believe that increasing obesity, 
new diseases, global warming, weapons of mass 
destruction and biological limitations (the human 
frame just cannot go on forever) will halt increasing 
longevity. 
The CBD projection, in Figure 9 (pg 27), refers to the 
Cairns-Blake-Dowd stochastic mortality projection 
model (Cairns, Blake and Dowd, 2006). This uses 
population mortality data for England and Wales 
and is based on the observation that, at high ages, 
the percentage change in mortality rates is linearly 
increasing with age. It projects one of the sharpest 
increases in life expectancy because it takes into 
account in its projection the fact that mortality has 
been improving more rapidly in recent years.
The ‘92’ series projection, in Figure 9, refers to the 
single projection of life expectancy incorporated into 
the ‘92’ series tables. These preceded the ‘00’ series 
and were based on mortality experience centred on 
1992. 
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The ONS 2006 principal projection, in Figure 9
(pg 27), refers to the ONS principal longevity 
projection based on 2006 data for England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.
The ‘Paternoster’ projection reflects a scenario 
used for capital adequacy modelling purposes in 
which 50% of today’s 30 year olds will live to 100 
(Paternoster, 2007). 
Richards (2008) has developed a model of life 
expectancy based on both pension size and lifestyle 
(where the latter is proxied by postcode). He claims 
that his model explains socio-economic differences in 
life expectancy better than models based on pension 
size or lifestyle alone. 
Table 7 shows the combined effect of both pension 
size and lifestyle on the life expectancy of 65 year old 
males and females based on the data in a combined 
portfolio of life-office pensioners and members of 
defined benefit schemes.
To put the values in Table 7 into context, the 
equivalent life expectancy using the ‘00’ series 
tables is 18.4 years for males and 20.9 years for 
females. Table 7 suggests that the differences in life 
expectancies are even greater when a more complete 
range of socio-economic factors are taken into 
account.
3.5 Summary
UK life expectancy increased steadily during the 
20th century and, today, there is a range of views 
about the likelihood of any future increases. This 
reflects both the uncertainty of life and the lack of an 
accepted longevity forecasting model.
Willets et al (2004) suggest that there is ‘clear 
potential for further significant improvements in 
longevity’ (paragraph 3.6.1) and that it ‘is impossible 
to argue that we are hitting some kind of biological 
barrier that is going to prevent further improvements. 
Moreover, the potential for further improvements 
is greatest for ages 60 to 80’, i.e. pensioners; and, 
they might have added, for those in the lower social 
classes. 
In the next section, we explore what this might mean 
for your pension scheme’s cost.
Table 7 Impact of pension size and lifestyle on life expectancy
of 65 year old males and females
Gender  Pension size Lifestyle  Life expectancy
   (years)
Female Highest Upper 22.88
Male Highest Upper 20.23
Male Highest Lower 18.56
Male Middle Lower 17.06
Male Lowest Lower 15.62
Source: Richards (2008)
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4 Longevity risk
Increased life expectancy raises the cost of 
pension provision. However, if the increase is fully 
anticipated, you can respond by, for example, 
requiring your scheme members to pay higher 
contributions when they are in work or to 
work longer before retiring. They might not like 
either prospect, but you can use such methods, 
separately or in combination, to maintain the 
viability of your pension scheme.
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So it is not the increase in life expectancy per se that 
threatens the viability of your pension scheme, rather, 
it is the uncertainty about how long your scheme 
members are going to live after they retire that is the 
problem. 
Figure 10 shows likely ages at death for a random 
selection of ten individuals – five men and five 
women – aged 65 (it is based on US unisex annuity 
rates). The earliest expected death is at age 69, while 
the latest is at age 99, thirty years later. Now it is 
likely that the men will be concentrated amongst the 
earlier deaths and women will be overrepresented 
amongst the later deaths, but the figure shows clearly 
that it is virtually impossible to predict with any 
accuracy when a particular individual will die; this is 
what is meant by longevity risk.
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Figure 10 Variability in longevity for five males and five females, aged 65
4.1 Idiosyncratic and aggregate longevity risk
Source: Benartzi (2007)
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4 Longevity risk
4.2 The cost of longevity risk
If your organisation has a DB pension scheme, 
its cost will be highly sensitive to changes in 
longevity assumptions. We can illustrate the 
financial consequences of different life expectancy 
assumptions diagrammatically. Consider a pension 
scheme with assets of £800 million, liabilities with 
a present discounted value of £1 billion, calculated 
using the medium cohort projection, and therefore a 
deficit of £200 million. Figure 11 (pg 33) shows you 
what the deficit might be if the liabilities were valued 
on the basis of the other longevity assumptions 
shown in Figure 9 (pg 27).
We can draw a distinction between ‘idiosyncratic’ or 
‘individual’ longevity risk and ‘aggregate’ or ‘collective’ 
longevity risk (King, 2004). 
Idiosyncratic longevity risk arises because life 
expectancy differs from person to person: we do 
not know at what age any specific individual will die. 
Figure 10 (pg 31) illustrates idiosyncratic longevity 
risk – the uncertainty attached to the timing of 
an individual’s death. Idiosyncratic longevity risk is 
manageable because it can be eliminated by risk 
pooling, performed by annuity providers. They sell 
annuities to lots of different people, realising that 
some annuitants will die early, creating a so-called 
‘mortality profit’ that helps to pay for those who 
live longer than average. If the ten 65 year olds died 
precisely at the ages depicted in Figure 10 (pg 31), an 
annuity provider, such as a life office, could still make 
a profit from selling annuities even if it did not know 
in advance which annuitant would die when. 
Aggregate longevity risk arises because of the 
uncertainty surrounding the life expectancy of a 
whole generation or cohort. Aggregate longevity risk 
is a problem because it is currently very hard to hedge 
this risk. It is the difficulty in obtaining aggregate 
longevity risk insurance that has contributed to the 
sharp decline in private sector provision of defined 
benefit pensions (King, 2004).
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The calculations which underlie Figure 11 are crude. In 
particular, they make little allowance for the specific 
characteristics of a pension plan’s membership, but 
they should give you a feel for the effect of longevity 
risk. The Pensions Regulator in The purple book (2007) 
estimates that each year of extra life adds about 3% 
to the value of a defined benefit plan’s liabilities; the 
differences in Figure 11 are broadly consistent with 
this estimate.
Figure 11 uses best estimate (i.e. most likely) 
longevity projections to illustrate the potential 
financial consequences of aggregate longevity risk. 
The uncertainty surrounding future longevity is now 
such that the ‘00’ series of actuarial tables does 
not incorporate any specific projections of future 
mortality. Pension actuaries are, instead, expected 
to consider a range of scenarios when estimating life 
expectancy. To help them, the CMI published a library 
of mortality projections in November 2007 (CMI, 
2007b). The highest projected life expectancies in the 
draft library are 26.0 years for 65 year old men and 
31.8 years for 65 year old women in 2007.
You need a best estimate longevity assumption for 
accounting and regulatory purposes. For all other 
purposes, when considering longevity risk, you 
should take into account a range of possible future 
life expectancies rather than focus on single number 
best estimates. Do not think about a pension deficit 
of £190 million, to take the CBD case in Figure 11; 
think, instead, of a deficit that might fall within a 
range of, say, £140 – £245 million, knowing that even 
this apparently wide range might underestimate the 
eventual outcome. How do we determine such a 
range?
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Figure 11 Comparison of pension deficit using different mortality assumptions
Source: Pensions Institute calculations
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4 Longevity risk
results of these studies in connection with your own 
scheme but, given this is usually impractical, then you 
can still conduct ‘what if’ experiments.
•  What would happen to your pension liabilities if 
mortality rates fell by 1% at each age?
•  What would happen if your plan members 
experience mortality similar to that at the upper 
end of the range in Figure 9 (pg 27)? Could your 
company survive apocalyptic demography?
Figure 12 shows the range of life expectancy 
assumptions made for 65 year old male employees by 
FTSE100 companies in their 2006 accounts.
4.3 A range of views
One way is to use ‘scenario analysis’. 
If all your scheme members suddenly adopted a 
healthy lifestyle, by how much would that increase 
their average life expectancy? If, on the other hand, 
they all started eating more junk food, by how much 
would that reduce life expectancy? 
Research is required to answer these questions. 
The results of relevant controlled experiments are 
highlighted in medical science literature and many of 
these studies will have been conducted on individuals 
from different countries. You could consider the 
2 The Lane, Clark and Peacock data were for male life expectancy at age 60. We have re-scaled this to age 65 for all sectors on the 
basis of the relative medium cohort life expectancies at ages 60 and 65 in 2007.
Figure 12 Life expectancy assumptions reported in 2006 by FTSE100 companies for 65 year old males 
Source: Pensions Institute calculations based on Lane, Clark and Peacock (2007).2
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The columns in Figure 12 (pg 34) show the different 
levels of life expectancy assumptions, across 
industrial sector. The vertical lines show the extent 
of the range within each sector, which in turn reflects 
the number of companies within the sector. The 
highest assumed life expectancies are found in the 
financial, telecoms, oil and gas and healthcare sectors 
(which employ large numbers of white collar workers). 
The lowest assumed life expectancies are found in 
the consumer goods, utilities and basic materials 
sectors (predominantly blue collar industries). There 
is considerable variation between the assumptions of 
individual companies within a sector. As previously 
mentioned, each pension plan member’s life 
expectancy is unique. However, there is clearly a 
range of different scenarios, albeit unspecified, behind 
the range of assumed life expectancies shown in 
Figure 12 (pg 34). That range reflects differences in 
both current mortality rates and projected reductions 
in mortality rates.
Figure 9 (pg 27) showed us projected life expectancies 
for 65 year old males using a number of different 
projection models. Uncertainty surrounds each of 
these best estimate projections. Another way of 
illustrating the range of possible outcomes is to use 
fan charts.
4.4 Fan charts
Figure 13 is a longevity fan chart. It shows the 
widening funnel of uncertainty surrounding the CBD 
projection of life expectancy for 65 year old males 
shown in Figure 9 (pg 27).
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Figure 13 Longevity fan chart for 65 year old males in England and Wales
The width of the fan chart in Figure 13 indicates the 
degree of uncertainty about future life expectancy 
and different shades indicate different probability 
bands.
Source: Dowd et al (2007, Figure 3)
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With a life expectancy along the upper bound of 
the fan chart in Figure 13 (pg 35), the CBD deficit in 
Figure 11 (pg 33) might be £245 million while, with a 
life expectancy along the lower bound, it might only 
be £140 million. The vertical lines on the CBD column 
in Figure 11 (pg 33) indicate this range of possible 
values within the 90% confidence interval.
In Figure 5 (pg 22) we showed you some cohort 
survival curves. The 1951 cohort’s curve, in
Figure 5 (pg 22), was projected beyond the cohort’s 
then current age (54 in 2005). Uncertainty (aggregate 
longevity risk) surrounds that projection.
Figure 14 presents a survivor fan chart. It shows the 
90% confidence interval for the survival rates of 
English and Welsh males who reached 65 in 2003 as 
they progress through the remainder of their lifetimes. 
The central projection of life expectancy is the dark 
band in the middle of the fan chart; the CBD model’s 
best estimate of the life expectancy of a 65 year old 
man in 2050 is about 26 years, but the degree of 
confidence in this estimate is less than 10%. Each 
successive pair of differently shaded purple bands 
adds another 10% probability. The entire shaded area 
shows the 90% confidence interval for the forecast 
range of outcomes. We can be 90% confident that, by 
2050, the life expectancy of a 65 year old English or 
Welsh male will be between 21 and 32 years: a huge 
range of uncertainty.
���
��
��
��
��
�
����
������
������
���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
��
��
��
��
���
��
�
Figure 14 Survivor fan chart for 65 year old males in England and Wales
Source: Blake et al (2007, Figure 2)
Apocalyptic demography? Putting longevity risk in perspective | 37
Figure 14 shows that there is very little survivorship 
risk before age 75: a fairly reliable estimate is that 
25% of this group will have died by age 75. The 
uncertainty increases rapidly after 75 and reaches a 
maximum at around age 90 when anywhere between 
15% and 35% of the original population will still be 
alive (with a best estimate of 25%). Think of it: from 
100,000 65 year old pensioners today, you might 
expect 25,000 to be alive in 25 years’ time; but you 
might end up paying pensions to 35,000. This long 
so-called ‘toxic tail’ gradually expires some time 
between 2035 and 2045.
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•  Sell the liabilities via an insurance or reinsurance 
contract. This is known as a bulk annuity transfer 
or a pension fund buy out. It can take a variety 
of forms. The most common being a full buy out 
in which a life assurance company takes both the 
pension liabilities and the scheme assets from the 
sponsoring company in return for the company 
making good any difference immediately or for 
a loan which the company pays off over, say, ten 
years (or, if the scheme is in surplus, the sponsor 
receives a payment following the sale). The scheme 
must be closed to future accrual before this can 
happen.
•  An alternative to a full buy out is a partial buy 
out or ‘de-risking’ strategy in which a segment of 
the liabilities are bought out, such as pensions in 
payment, or all those over, say, 15 years, or all those 
belonging to members over the age of 70, or all 
deferred pension liabilities.
•  Manage the risk using mortality-linked instruments. 
These might be traded contracts (such as longevity 
bonds) or over-the-counter contracts (such as 
mortality swaps or forwards). These instruments 
are still at an early stage of development but, in 
the near future, we expect a new capital market 
to develop that will trade financial instruments 
that can be used to hedge aggregate longevity 
risk (Blake et al., 2008 and Loeys et al., 2007). In 
July 2007, JPMorgan announced the launch of a 
mortality forward contract with the name ‘q-
forward’ (Coughlan et al., 2007). It is a forward 
contract linked to a future mortality rate: ‘q’ is 
standard actuarial notation for a mortality rate. 
The contract involves the exchange of a realised 
mortality rate relating to a specified population on 
the maturity date of the contract in return for a 
fixed mortality rate agreed at the beginning of the 
contract.
4.5 Managing longevity risk
Funding your pension scheme’s toxic tail could be 
expensive. You might, therefore, want to consider 
seeking specialist pensions’ advice as to how you 
might be able to manage that cost. Here are some 
of the things that you might be able to do. It is likely 
that any benefit changes will apply only to future 
service.
4.5.1 Understanding longevity risk
•  Conduct a survey of the lifestyle habits of your 
scheme members.
•  Conduct a mortality analysis.
•  Prepare a longevity fan chart for your scheme. 
4.5.2 Managing longevity risk
•  As the Pension Commission (2005) suggests, 
instead of fixing the retirement age in advance, 
link the future pension age to changes in life 
expectancy.
•  Offer your employees lump sum pension payments 
instead of annuities, to the extent that this is 
permissible.
•  Index benefits to cohort longevity changes, as they 
do in Sweden.
•  Purchase an annuity at the time of retirement of 
each pension scheme member (your scheme will 
still bear longevity risk for current active members 
and deferred pensioners between now and their 
retirement dates). 
•  Offer your employees ‘enhanced transfer value 
payments’; they receive a payment into a defined 
contribution scheme in return for relinquishing their 
accrued pension entitlements.
•  Close your defined benefit scheme to new 
members, or to all members, and switch to a 
defined contribution scheme, or reduce future 
benefits such as a career-average scheme.
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Taking action to manage longevity risk should 
increase the security of your scheme members’ 
pension entitlements. But risk protection can be 
expensive and, clearly, you will have to weight its 
benefits against its cost. 
4.6 Summary
Aggregate longevity risk arises because we do not 
know the average length of life of a generation or 
cohort; uncertainty surrounds all life expectancy 
projections. 
We do know that the human lifespan is not
pre-programmed; that it can be influenced by 
lifestyle; that science has slowed the ageing process; 
and that scientific, medical and social researchers 
are striving to slow it further. We also know that 
the cost of pension provision is sensitive to changes 
in life expectancy assumptions; that it is those 
pensioners with big pensions who live longest; and 
that aggregate longevity risk is hard to diversify. So, 
funding your pension scheme’s toxic tail could be 
expensive. You might, therefore, want to consider 
seeking specialist pensions’ advice as to how you 
might be able to manage that cost.
We hope that this report and the Longevity risk 
checklist (pg 53-59) will help you, in discussions 
with your scheme’s actuary, to understand 
the longevity assumptions underlying your 
organisation’s defined benefit pension obligations 
and their consequences.
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‘92’ series: life tables produced by the Continuing 
Mortality Investigation (see CMI) founded on 
mortality experienced, centred on 1992. 
They incorporate an allowance for future 
improvements. Separate tables are prepared for 
males and females, and age-specific mortality tables 
(where the rate at each age is an average weighted 
by pension amounts). Such tables are known as 
‘amounts’ tables. Tables compiled without such 
weighting are known as ‘lives’ tables.
‘00’ series: life tables produced by the CMI based 
on observations of life office pensioners centred on 
2000. As with the ‘92’ series, separate tables are 
prepared for males and females and for data averaged 
by amount of pension and by lives. However, the ‘00’ 
series tables do not incorporate any projections of 
future improvement.
Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD): a stochastic mortality 
projection model that has been used to develop a 
series of longevity, mortality and survivor fan charts. 
It is built on the observation that, at high ages, the 
percentage change in mortality rates is linearly 
increasing with age.
Cohort: a group of people who have an event, 
attribute or experience in common. For example, a 
birth-cohort would include all those born within a 
specified time period (e.g. a year). Other examples 
would include all those who joined an organisation on 
the same day.
Cohort effect: a term used by the Office for National 
Statistics (see ONS) and the Continuing Mortality 
Investigation (see CMI) to describe a higher than 
average rate of improvement in mortality rates for 
generations born in the UK (between 1925 and 1945 
in the case of the ONS description, and between 1910 
and 1942 in the case of the CMI description) which 
have more marked reductions in mortality than the 
generations born before or after. The assumed period 
of future years over which the cohort effect persists 
can vary. 
•  Short cohort: the assumed period is until 2010.
•  Medium cohort: the assumed period is until 2020.
•  Long cohort: the assumed period is until 2040.
Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI): 
a committee of The Actuarial Profession which 
produces life tables for use by insurers and pension 
plans.
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Mortality rate: a measure of the frequency of 
occurrence of deaths in a defined population during 
a specified time interval. It refers to the assumed 
probability of dying within a year, calculated using 
historical data.
Mortality improvement: rate of decrease in 
mortality rate, usually in respect of the progression 
of time.
Office for National Statistics (ONS): the official 
agency responsible for producing mortality statistics 
for England and Wales and population estimates for 
UK, after 31 January 2006.
Underpin: an adjustment to mortality tables in which 
future improvement rates are subject to a minimum 
value. For example, a 1% underpin to the medium 
cohort projection means that it is assumed that the 
rate of improvement in mortality declines as per the 
medium cohort projection until it gets to 1% per 
annum and then it continues at that rate into the 
future.
Note: this glossary has been compiled from several 
sources including Coughlan et al. (2007), the Pensions 
Regulator (2007 and 2008) and various Office for 
National Statistics sources. 
Government Actuary’s Department (GAD):
the body responsible for UK population estimates and 
projections prior to 31 January 2006.
Life expectancy: the average number of years a 
person of a given age would live under a given set 
of mortality conditions. Life expectancy is usually 
computed on the basis of a life table showing the 
probability of dying at each age for a given population 
according to the age-specific death rates prevailing at 
a given period.
Lifespan: average age at death. Also equal to the sum 
of life expectancy and current age.
Life table: a rectangular matrix, showing changes 
in a standard set of functions (columns) across ages 
(rows). It describes the extent to which a generation 
of people, or cohort, dies off with age. An example of 
a life table is set out above.
The central death rate is the proportion of people of 
that age who die during the year. It differs from the 
probability of death at age x which is the proportion 
of people who die at that age. So, a person who 
reaches 65 in 2007 and dies at that age in 2008 will 
be included in the probability of death rate in 2007 
but will not be counted in the central death rate for 
2007.
Because women typically live longer than men, 
separate life tables are often produced for each 
gender.
Longevity: How long scheme beneficiaries are 
expected to live. This refers to the future expected 
lifetime derived from any particular set of mortality 
rates.
Interim life table, United Kingdom
Period expectation of life based on data for the years 2003-05
 Age   Males
 x m(x) q(x) l(x) d(x) e(x)
 0 0.005660 0.005644 100000.0 564.4 76.62
 65 0.016158 0.016028 83857.9 1344.1 16.63
The column headings are: 
 m(x) Central death rate at age x
 q(x) Probability of death at age x
 l(x) Number of survivors to age x 
 d(x) Death number at age x
 e(x) Life expectancy at age x
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pensions-institute.org) are to undertake high 
quality research in all fields related to pensions, to 
communicate the results of that research to the 
academic and practitioner community, to establish 
an international network of pensions researchers 
from a variety of disciplines, and to provide expert 
independent advice to the pensions industry and 
government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For 
the first time disciplines such as economics, 
finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to 
accounting, corporate governance, law and regulation 
have been brought together in order to enhance 
strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions.
As the first and only UK academic research centre 
focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions Institute 
unites some of the world’s leading experts in these 
fields in order to offer an integrated approach to the 
complex problems that arise in this field.
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide 
range of fields, including: 
Pension microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension 
planning, long term savings and retirement decisions. 
Pension fund management and performance
The investment management and investment 
performance of occupational and personal pension 
schemes. 
Pension funding and valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension 
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guarantees. 
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The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension 
fund management. 
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Marketing
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pension products. 
Macroeconomics of pensions
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impact of the size and maturity of pension funds on 
other sectors of the economy (e.g. corporate, public 
and international sectors).
Public policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension 
provision and other employee benefits in the light of 
factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the demographic developments in Europe 
and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may 
include views on policy but the Pensions Institute 
itself takes no institutional policy positions.
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